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Chapter 2
Anarcho-Multiculturalism
The Pure Theory of Liberalism
Chandran Kukathas 

THE PROBLEM OF MULTICULTURALISM
Most modern states today are, at least to some degree, culturally diverse. 
Trade, tourism, international dialogue among scholars, scientists, and artists, 
and the movement of skilled labor—as well as migration—have ensured that 
few countries do not contain within them signifi cant numbers of people from 
alien cultures. The one cultural minority found almost everywhere is the in-
ternational frequent fl yer. Many societies today are multicultural because they 
are open to a diversity of peoples who come and go and, sometimes, stay.1
It is the fact that many seek to stay in the societies they have entered, 
however, that gives rise to the problem of multiculturalism.2 For it gives rise 
to the question of the degree to which cultural diversity should be accepted 
or tolerated, as well as to the question of how cultural diversity should be ac-
commodated. When people from diverse traditions have to coexist within a 
single society, a number of issues have to be settled so that the ground rules 
governing their common life are clear and generally accepted. There has to 
be some clear understanding not only of what kind of conduct is acceptable 
or required in public but also of what kinds of matters are matters of legiti-
mate public concern. This means that it has to be clear, for example, what 
is the language of public discourse, what kinds of holidays are recognized, 
what customs are to be tolerated, what standards of public conduct and ap-
pearance may be expected, and what rights and obligations individuals and 
communities enjoy or owe.
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The fact of cultural diversity has often given rise to confl icts because 
these issues are not always easily settled. People often have strong views 
about what is right and wrong, or about what is good and bad, and they 
are consequently unwilling readily to modify their behavior or change their 
thinking. Thus, for example, Muslim parents in France and (more recently) 
in Singapore have challenged the legality as well as the moral justifi ability 
of state school regulations forbidding the wearing of headscarves favored by 
Muslim girls (or their parents). Defenders of animal rights in Britain have 
questioned exemptions given to religious minorities to allow them to disre-
gard laws governing the humane slaughter of animals (to ensure that meat 
is kosher or halal). In many Western societies the practice of female genital 
mutilation insisted upon by some immigrant parents from East Africa has 
led to vigorous debate as authorities have struggled to fi nd solutions that re-
spect minority convictions without departing from more widely held social 
values. And in Australia, the cultural practices of some Aboriginal peoples, 
particularly in the Northern Territory, have brought into focus the issue of 
how far indigenous people ought to be able to live according to their own 
laws and enforce their own standards of justice.
In these circumstances, to seek the theoretical foundations of multicul-
turalism is to ask if there is any set of general principles that might guide our 
refl ection on such issues as the ones raised above. What are the principles 
that govern a multicultural society?
In this essay, I shall argue that the best answer to this question is to be 
found within the theory of classical liberalism. The question of what is liber-
alism, however, is nothing if not controversial, so it ought to be made clear 
at the outset that what will be presented here is a particular understanding 
of classical liberalism, and a particular view of what it has to offer. There are 
others, however, who take a quite different view of what it is that liberalism 
requires or has to offer. In my own presentation I will therefore try to make 
clear where it is that I differ from other liberal views prominent today.
The essay is presented in several parts. In the next section I begin by con-
sidering fi ve possible responses to the problem of cultural diversity. These 
are labeled isolationism, assimilationism, minimalist or pure multicultural-
ism, strong or eager multiculturalism, and apartheid. In the third section I 
suggest how these different positions are related and identify some of the 
theorists of multiculturalism and locate them in the schema described there. 
In the fourth section I argue that the third of the responses to the problem of 
diversity is most consistent with classical liberalism, and offer reasons why 
it is to be favored. The fi fth section considers a number of arguments of-
fered in defense of other versions of multiculturalism, and particularly other 
liberal versions, and explains why they should be rejected. I conclude with 
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some general remarks about the nature of a multicultural society, the nature 
of political society, and the limits of the liberal theory of multiculturalism.
FIVE RESPONSES TO DIVERSITY
Societies may respond to the fact of cultural diversity in a variety of ways, 
not all of which involve an acceptance of the idea of a multicultural society. 
There are fi ve responses that might usefully be distinguished.
Isolationism
The most obvious response a society might make would be to try to prevent 
any kind of cultural diversity from emerging by excluding outsiders from 
entering or making their homes within it—particularly if the outsiders are 
different. Both Japan and Australia have, at different times in their histories, 
adopted this particular approach. In Australia, the White Australia policy 
came into being with the fi rst Act of the Commonwealth Parliament, the 
Immigration Act of 1901. The original aim of Australian immigration policy 
was to assimilate immigrants into the predominantly Anglo-Celtic popula-
tion. Migrant selection was carefully controlled to ensure that the ethnic 
composition remained white and culturally British. Those most preferred 
were Britons, followed by Northern Europeans. Southern Europeans were 
considered less desirable, and Asian and other nonwhites were regarded 
as altogether undesirable. Migrants from the desired categories were thus 
offered fi nancial inducements to move to Australia, while those from Asia 
were excluded (Lopez 2000: 43).3 It was not until the 1960s that steps were 
taken to dismantle the policy, which was offi cially ended in 1973.
There are many reasons why a society or its rulers might choose the 
path of isolationism in a policy of excluding all outsiders but the select few. 
Sometimes it is because of a desire on the part of some to protect or preserve 
their established advantages or privileges. A predominantly Muslim elite, for 
example, might not want to see the growth of the substantial non-Muslim 
minority if this might reduce the size of its support base. Or the labor move-
ment might be wary of immigration from poorer nations because it would 
threaten to lower wage levels by expanding the size of the market for un-
skilled labor. But a particularly important reason for isolationism in immi-
gration policy is the fear of cultural transformation.
The problem with isolationism as a policy is that it is diffi cult to sustain, 
for the costs of the policy are greater than most people are willing to bear. If 
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the aim of the policy is to preserve a kind of cultural homogeneity, the dif-
fi culty is that it will not be enough simply to try to maintain a restrictive im-
migration policy—one that keeps out people from particular cultural, ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic groups, or keeps out would-be immigrants altogether. 
There are many ways in which a society might come under the infl uence of 
foreign cultures besides through interaction with immigrants. Trade and 
tourism alone will bring the domestic society to awareness of other ways 
of life. And any kind of openness to foreign artistic and literary traditions 
will exert its own infl uence on the local population, encouraging imitation 
and cultural borrowing. The importing of foods will change dietary habits. 
Participation in international activities, from World Cup football to inter-
national science conventions, will also bring home ideas and attitudes from 
other parts of the globe. To preserve cultural homogeneity it would not be 
enough to restrict immigration. It would also be necessary to limit contact 
with the outside world by restricting the freedom of the domestic population 
to travel, trade, and generally communicate with outsiders. Thus far, no na-
tion has been able or willing to do this, and so no nation has been able to 
escape the forces of cultural transformation.
Assimilationism
One alternative to isolationism is a policy of admitting outsiders but with 
a view to assimilating them into the existing society, thereby limiting the 
extent of domestic cultural transformation. This is a policy that seeks to ac-
culturate newcomers, though it might also be adopted with respect to, say, a 
minority indigenous population. For much of the era of the White Australia 
policy, the Aboriginal population of the country was seen as one that needed 
to be assimilated into the mainstream of a predominantly Anglo-Celtic and 
European society. In this regard, Australian social policy for much of the 
twentieth century was marked by assimilationist aims on two fronts, looking 
to make both newcomers and the original inhabitants conform to a particu-
lar cultural standard.
The problem with the policy of assimilation, however, is that, like iso-
lationism, its chances of success are limited even if one is prepared to pay 
a very high price to pursue it. First, assimilation is a two-way street: even as 
newcomers are being assimilated, they will be exerting their own infl uence 
to modify the practices and attitudes of the host society.4 This, coupled with 
the other sources of cultural infl uence to which the society is subject, makes 
it fairly likely that it is not only newcomers or minorities who will change. 
Second, not all cultural minorities want to assimilate to the degree sought 
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by the makers of social policy. In Australia, the turning point came when it 
became clear that many immigrants who had lived for some time in their 
new country began in the 1960s to consider returning to Europe because 
they saw their own cultural traditions and beliefs as unwelcome. This was 
one of the factors that prompted a change in government policy away from 
assimilation toward a more pluralist outlook. But even if cultural minorities 
are not willing to go so far as to leave the country, many will resist attempts 
to assimilate them. At the extreme, this may generate separatist tendencies 
if resistance leads to a hardening of attitudes on all sides. Third, assimila-
tion may be diffi cult policy to pursue in a society that has strong traditions 
of respect for individual freedom, since such a policy may require restric-
tions not only on newcomers but also on native-born citizens.
Minimalist or Pure Multiculturalism
While assimilation may be diffi cult to enforce, it is also diffi cult to avoid. In 
any society in which there is a reasonable degree of freedom, people will as-
sociate with and imitate one another. There is a tendency to conformity that 
is as diffi cult to eradicate as is the inclination of some individuals to go in a 
different direction. And for reasons of expediency or prudence, newcomers 
or minorities in any society will be inclined to follow the dominant norms 
simply because it makes life easier, less costly, or more enjoyable. It is easier 
to learn the language that most people speak than to wait for them to learn 
our own. It is easier to make friends with people with whom we share some-
thing in common. And it is better to have a wide range of people with whom 
to speak or form friendships than to be confi ned to the company of a few 
who are like-minded in every way.
The multiculturalist response to the fact of cultural diversity is neither 
to try to prevent diversity from emerging in society by isolating it from others, 
nor to try to prevent diversity from taking root by assimilating minorities into 
the whole. Early immigration policy in Australia was concerned—alarmed—
by the prospect of non–Anglo-Celtic minorities making their homes in 
Australia. In 1971, the then minister for immigration, Phillip Lynch, while 
willing to continue the new policy of accepting European and Asian immi-
grants, expressed a concern that Australia would be home to a large number 
of “undigested minorities” (NMAC 1999: 22–23). The multicultural outlook, 
however, is both willing to accept a diversity of newcomers to a society and 
untroubled if they remain undigested. The doors should be open to any-
one who wishes to enter society; and the extent to which anyone assimilates 
should be determined by the desire and capacity of each individual to do so.
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Strong or Eager Multiculturalism
One characteristic of the minimalist multiculturalist view, however, is that 
it leaves open the possibility that some people will assimilate into a society 
less because they wish to do so than because they have little other option. It 
leaves such people, members of minority cultures within the wider society, 
either unable to enjoy their separate cultural identity because the costs of 
sustaining it are too high, or unable fully to participate in the society because 
of their particular cultural beliefs or traditions. The strong multiculturalist 
view is that society should take positive measures not only to enable such 
people to participate as full members of society but also better to enable 
them to maintain their separate identity and traditions. Diversity should 
not only be tolerated but also fostered or promoted, and supported—both 
fi nancially (if necessary) and by special rights for minority cultures.
The difference between the strong and minimalist versions of multi-
culturalism is a matter of degree. Both variants have their roots in liberal 
political theory, with strong multiculturalism characteristic of modern 
liberalism and minimalist multiculturalism characteristic of classical liber-
alism. In this essay I shall defend minimalist multiculturalism against 
strong multiculturalism by defending classical liberalism against its modern 
competitor.
Apartheid
There is a fi fth response to the fact of diversity that ought to be mentioned 
for the sake of completeness: apartheid. This response does not seek to ex-
clude cultural minorities (usually because it is not possible to do so) but 
forbids them to assimilate to any degree. South Africa under white minority 
rule supplies an example of such a regime, though in this particular case the 
groups denied the right to participate fully in the society themselves formed 
a majority of the total population.
The problem with this response to diversity is that is hard to sustain 
given people’s propensities to associate. It suffers from the same diffi cul-
ties that beset the isolationist response. In some ways, however, it confronts 
problems that are even more intractable since the people it seeks to keep 
apart coexist within the same national boundaries. It is diffi cult to maintain 
such a regime without creating a polity in which different citizens have dif-
ferent and unequal rights and duties. It may be impossible to sustain such a 
form of political order without resort to repression.
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A MODEL OF RESPONSES TO DIVERSITY
This typology of responses to diversity might usefully be presented on a 
graph illustrating their relations to one another. Responses toward cultural 
diversity might be plotted on a graph whose vertical axis measures the 
polity’s attitude to the integration of diverse peoples into society and whose 
horizontal axis measures the polity’s attitude to the membership of different 
peoples in the polity. At one extreme, a polity might simply deny minority 
cultures or communities within it the right to become a part of the society, 
refusing to allow them to integrate into the society. Equally, it might deny 
outsiders the opportunity to join the society by forbidding them to enter or 
to become members; it might even expel minorities from the polity. At the 
other extreme, a polity might require that some groups of people integrate 
into the society even if they have no wish to do so. Equally, a polity might 
require that a group of people acquire or retain membership in the polity 
whether or not they wish to do so. But political societies do not have to take 
extreme positions. They might try either to deter or to promote integration, 
or they might simply tolerate those who wish to integrate without let or hin-
drance. And they might respond in similarly moderate fashion to those who 
seek membership in the polity. A number of political positions can be identi-
fi ed along these dimensions. These are noted on the graph in fi gure 1.
Figure 1: Responses to Diversity
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Societies that try to restrict membership by forbidding entry by outsid-
ers, and also to enforce conformity within their boundaries by denying those 
who are different the opportunity to integrate, fall into the corner labeled 
“isolationism.” Though it is diffi cult to fi nd examples of societies that fall 
neatly into any category, Uganda under Idi Amin might fi t here, since it not 
only restricted entry into the country but also expelled the Asian popula-
tion rather than let it integrate or assimilate into the native population. Less 
extreme, in some ways, is the position labeled “apartheid.” In such a society, 
the membership in the polity of diverse groups is accepted, but particu-
lar groups are forbidden to integrate into society. A more extreme position 
would be one that forced some into membership in a society while denying 
them any opportunity to integrate. Slavery in the United States falls into this 
category, since Africans were forcibly brought to America but, by virtue of 
being enslaved, were forbidden to integrate into society. (Historically, not all 
forms of slavery forbade the integration of slaves into society.)
Some societies are less hostile to others integrating into their way of life 
but remain unwilling to allow them fully to become members of the polity. 
A society might, for example, welcome guest workers and willingly allow 
them to live as a part of society but deny them full rights of membership. 
Germany’s attitude toward Turkish residents and Malaysia’s attitude toward 
Indonesian and Filipino workers supply possible examples here. To identify 
this position I use the term “meticism,” after the metics or foreign residents 
of city-states of ancient Greece.5 
Societies that want to see other peoples conform to their way of life but 
are unwilling to allow them to become a part of that society occupy the top 
left-hand corner of the graph. These are labeled “interventionist” societies. 
Crusading states would come into this category. They differ, however, from 
imperialist states, which are distinguished by a concern to incorporate other 
societies into a greater polity, expanding the membership of a highly inte-
grated state. These states occupy the top right-hand corner of the graph. Not 
all imperialist states, however, seek full integration of subjugated peoples. 
The millet system of the Ottoman Empire required societies within the em-
pire to remain members but tolerated a diversity of cultural practices and 
traditions.
States that tolerate or permit the admission of outsiders without seeking 
forcibly to enforce membership, but nonetheless require all members of so-
ciety to integrate fully into the ways of the dominant culture, are “assimila-
tionist” polities. These fall into the top center section of the graph. Modern 
France comes close to falling into this category, since it admits a diversity of 
peoples but strongly requires that they conform in various ways to French 
traditions; indeed, it requires that they become French.
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Finally, those political societies that fall in the center of the graph are 
what might be called “liberal multicultural” societies. In general, they admit 
outsiders without either encouraging or deterring them from seeking mem-
bership, and tolerate their ways whether they seek to integrate into the new 
society or elect to hold on to their separate traditions and beliefs. 
The various positions plotted in this scheme are highly stylized, and 
it would be hard to fi nd any state that fell precisely into one of the corners 
or spaces identifi ed. And the place a state occupies would be changeable to 
some degree depending on the policies pursued at any one time. This scheme 
is intended to be suggestive rather than indicative of any permanent or en-
during set of relations among political societies. Nonetheless, this scheme is 
intended to make one claim clear: that the liberal attitude to cultural diver-
sity seeks a medium among extremes. It is also intended to suggest that the 
differences among liberal multiculturalists refl ect the way in which liberals 
are pulled in different directions. The position I wish to defend, however, is 
to be found squarely in the center of the conception of liberalism described 
by this construction.
CLASSICAL LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM
Liberalism is a doctrine that is profoundly sympathetic to multiculturalism 
because it proclaims the importance of individual freedom to live a life of 
his or her own, even if the majority of society disapproves of the way that 
life is lived. According to liberalism’s traditions, minority ways, or differ-
ences, are to be tolerated rather than suppressed. By implication, this means 
that minority cultures are accepted within a liberal society: people are not 
required to live by values they cannot abide, nor forbidden to live by values 
they cherish. The fundamental liberal concern, therefore, is to fi nd some 
way in which those who hold to different values might live together with-
out coming into confl ict. This is a serious problem, since the potential for 
confl ict is high in a society in which all seek, and in principle are granted 
the right, to live by values they cherish—or at least, not to live by values they 
cannot abide. Liberals have therefore argued vigorously among themselves 
about the basis upon which people’s pursuit of their different, and poten-
tially confl icting, purposes should be regulated. Perhaps the most famous 
liberal attempt to specify a basis for such regulation is John Stuart Mill’s 
harm principle: only the prospect of harm to others can justify the restriction 
of individual freedom to pursue particular ends. As is well known, however, 
the principle is problematic because the defi nition of “harm” is itself depen-
dent on one’s understanding of what ends are desirable.
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In spite of such diffi culties, however, the virtue of the liberal view is that 
it takes seriously the idea that, when people disagree about what is good 
and what is right, the issue should not be settled by the exercise of power to 
enforce the dominant view.6 In the face of disagreement or difference what 
should be sought is peaceful coexistence. This is why it is, in principle, sym-
pathetic to the idea of a culturally diverse society, for in such a society people 
may associate freely with whomsoever they choose without being required 
to conform to standards they do not recognize or cannot abide. But this is 
only possible provided each respects a similar freedom for others. And it is 
the content of this proviso that liberalism tries to articulate. 
What this requires, in the end, is a regime of toleration. And in the 
version of liberalism sometimes described as “classical liberalism,” that tol-
eration calls for what I have labeled “pure multiculturalism.” In a society 
in which pure multiculturalism is the norm, people’s freedom to associate 
produces an open society of which others may readily become members by 
associating with those who already belong to it. It neither forbids outsiders 
from entering nor forces them to join. Equally, those who are a part of the 
society are free to live by their own traditions, whether as part of a cosmo-
politan whole or as members of minority cultures who associate with others 
to a minimal degree. The presence of different cultures or traditions is toler-
ated, even if those traditions do not themselves embrace or sympathize with 
liberalism or liberal values. A classical liberal multicultural society may con-
tain within it many illiberal elements. Yet it will try neither to expel nor to 
assimilate them, but will simply tolerate them. What such a regime is most 
hostile to are isolationism, interventionism, imperialism, and slavery.
A classical liberal multicultural regime such as this could be described 
as a maximally tolerant regime. It is so tolerant it will even accept within its 
midst those who are opposed to it. At the same time, however, it will not give 
special protection or advantages to any particular group or community. It 
will not deter anyone from pursuing particular goals or from trying to sus-
tain particular traditions; yet neither will it promote others or subsidize ones 
that are specially preferred. This is multiculturalism without fear or favor.
MODERN LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM
To some liberal thinkers, however, this kind of multiculturalism is implau-
sible, because it does not maintain a strong enough commitment to values 
that are central to liberalism. Some liberals are reluctant to embrace any form 
of multiculturalism and argue strongly that liberalism requires that all com-
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munities or cultures within the liberal state be liberal to some degree—per-
haps even to a considerable degree. 
Brian Barry (2001), for example, is highly critical of multiculturalism 
from a liberal point of view, arguing that the liberal state should not tolerate 
illiberal practices. This means that the state should, among other things, 
assume responsibility for the education of children to ensure that cultural 
or religious communities cannot inculcate implausible beliefs in the minds 
of the young. It should also ensure that the standards maintained within 
families properly recognize the rights of women and take steps to prevent 
cultural communities from disadvantaging those who withdraw or defect 
from such groups (cf. Kukathas 2002).
Other liberal theorists, however, defend a strong version of multicultural-
ism, arguing that a multicultural state should recognize group-differentiated 
rights and offer special protections to minority cultures. For Will Kymlicka 
(1989, 1995, 2001a), for example, the liberal state should take active steps to 
ensure that groups have the resources they need to sustain themselves.7 This 
means not simply subsidizing their activities but also ensuring that legal and 
political arrangements do not discriminate against or disadvantage cultural 
minorities. Equally, however, the state should also make sure that cultural 
groups respect certain basic civil rights to which all individuals are entitled 
in a liberal order. For Kymlicka, the stance of “pure liberalism” offers a 
policy that amounts to little more than “benign neglect,” and such a policy, 
he argues, ultimately fails properly to address the crucial questions that con-
front a multicultural polity.
Both of these thinkers resist the classical liberal call for the state to be 
less interventionist and more “neutral” on cultural issues, though Barry is 
inclined to push the state into greater efforts to liberalize cultural minori-
ties, while Kymlicka prefers that the state take stronger measures to ensure 
that minorities can be secure in their effort to maintain their cultural inde-
pendence. Other modern theorists, however, are resistant to classical liberal 
multiculturalism because they push away from it in quite different direc-
tions. For “cultural conservatives,” what is needed for a sustainable polity 
is a society that is culturally homogeneous to a considerable degree. This 
means that the state, including the liberal state, has to be wary of admitting 
people who are culturally different and likely to dilute the cultural homoge-
neity of the society, so membership has to be deterred. Equally importantly, 
however, it is necessary that the state not be too quick to encourage those 
already within its boundaries to integrate into society because not everyone 
is suitable for citizenship. Those who are not culturally similar ought not to 
be encouraged to integrate, for the result will be a polity that is more het-
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erogeneous. In this respect, it ought not to be easy for residents to become 
citizens—for diversity ought to be discouraged (Pickus 1998).
Other thinkers, who might be labeled postmodernists or radicals, push 
away from classical liberal multiculturalism for different reasons again. For 
them, the liberal vision is too individualistic and too homogenizing. A good 
polity ought to welcome diversity by admitting outsiders readily; but it ought 
positively to encourage them to preserve their own traditions. Far greater rec-
ognition needs to be given to the importance of cultural identity to minority 
groups struggling to maintain a worthwhile life in modern political society. 
Such groups need to be included as members of political society, but also 
helped to preserve their identities as independent cultural communities.8
The conservative and radical thinkers I have identifi ed here might not 
be willing to regard themselves as part of the liberal camp. I place them 
there, nonetheless, because they do not resist or depart from liberal prin-
ciples in many respects. In general, they are advocates of a constitutional 
order in which individuals enjoy a signifi cant measure of freedom under the 
law, and which is, to a considerable degree, open to the outside world. What 
they share with the reluctant and the eager liberal multiculturalists is a rejec-
tion of the stance of classical liberalism. Where they differ, however, is in the 
level of their commitment to liberal values. Conservatives and radicals, in 
the end, are at best skeptical about liberalism and about the individualism 
they see at its heart. The theorists I have labeled “eager” and “reluctant” 
multiculturalists, however, are liberals who profess a serious commitment to 
liberal principles or liberal values. It is this commitment that is the source 
of their disagreement with the “pure” liberal position. 
For thinkers such as Kymlicka and Barry, who differ quite signifi cantly 
in their attitudes toward multiculturalism, a liberal society must be one 
whose communities or subgroups themselves respect liberal values—at least 
to some degree. For Barry (2001: chap. 4) they can only depart from liberal 
norms if they are associations that are fully voluntary associations of free 
adults. And such groups ought not to be given any particular encourage-
ment to maintain their separate, illiberal, forms of association. For Kym-
licka, on the other hand, it is important that minority cultural communities 
be helped partly because it is only if they receive assistance that their mem-
bers will be able to enjoy a measure of the autonomy that, in his view, is a 
value liberalism particularly commends. If they are to be helped, this means 
that they must be given assistance in their efforts to not only integrate but 
also maintain their separateness. This means that they must be given legal 
and political dispensations that will better enable them to survive and pros-
per in society. This may mean giving them special political representation, 
recognizing their cultural beliefs (say, by incorporating them into the struc-
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ture of national symbols or allowing the setting of public holidays to refl ect 
minority as well as majority religious practices), and allowing some groups 
exemptions from certain legal requirements. But it also means, in the second 
instance, making laws that enable groups to protect themselves from outside 
infl uences. In the case of indigenous peoples in particular, Kymlicka advo-
cates allowing and enabling groups to establish systems of self-government. 
In these respects, Kymlicka differs signifi cantly from Barry; but they share a 
conviction that independent groups in a liberal polity should respect some 
basic liberal values. Groups may not be wholly illiberal.
The classical liberal position, as it is understood in this essay, is charac-
terized by a far more signifi cant degree of tolerance insofar as it is willing 
to tolerate illiberalism within its midst. Classical liberal multiculturalism is 
thus willing to accept that, in a multicultural society, there may be groups 
or communities of people whose basic traditions or beliefs or practices are 
not only disapproved of by the majority but are even hostile to liberal val-
ues. Modern liberals reject this position because it is too tolerant of illiberal 
values. Some radical critics of liberalism reject it because it offers nonliberal 
communities no more than toleration. And conservative critics reject it be-
cause it fails to embrace particular nonliberal values. But from a classical 
liberal point of view, these other perspectives should be rejected because 
they demand too much of a political regime, for they demand that the re-
gime conform to particular substantive moral commitments. In the face of 
cultural diversity, this can only be a demand that a political society conform 
to the moral and cultural values of a particular—dominant—political group. 
The strength of the classical liberal view is that it resists such calls because, 
in the end, they can only amount to a demand that dissenting traditions 
be suppressed. If anything is characteristic of the liberal tradition, it is its 
wariness of the concentration of power and of the efforts of the powerful to 
suppress dissent. Liberal regimes have been notable for their commitment 
to the dispersal of power, and to the toleration of dissenting idea—be they 
conservative, socialist, fascist, theocratic, or simply antiliberal. If the liberal 
tradition accepts anything, it is that toleration is of fundamental importance, 
and that toleration requires a willingness to put up with what one dislikes.9
THE LIMITS OF CLASSICAL LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM
The theoretical foundations of multiculturalism, from my perspective, lie 
in the political theory of classical liberalism. Yet the plausibility of this view 
will surely be questioned for at least one reason: that it presents what can 
only be an impossible standard for any regime to meet. In its purest form, a 
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classical liberal multicultural regime seems at once to demand an impossi-
bly high standard—a standard of complete tolerance—and, at the same time, 
no standard at all, since any kind of cultural community or tradition must 
be accepted as a part of the polity. Can such a position possibly be sustained, 
either theoretically or in practical political terms?
In theoretical terms, classical liberal multiculturalism is a perfectly co -
herent position. If the analysis in this essay is sound, it a position that is 
readily identifi able, and may be plotted quite precisely in relation to a num-
ber of other liberal multicultural views, and to other political positions more 
generally. But in practical terms, it is a position that is unlikely ever to be 
found in the real world of politics, for there cannot be such a thing as a 
political regime that is morally or culturally neutral. The world described 
by classical liberal multiculturalism is a world in which there is, literally, no 
political regime. And that is not only a highly improbable world but also 
very defi nitely not the kind of world in which we live.
In Australia, for example, it would be diffi cult to argue that not only 
Aboriginal peoples but also immigrants should be able to live by their own 
legal and ethical traditions, or for that matter, that borders should be open. 
The obvious question this leads to is: what is the interest or relevance of 
this analysis of the theoretical foundations of multiculturalism, and of clas-
sical liberal multiculturalism more generally? The answer is that the idea of 
multiculturalism, insofar as the term identifi es a philosophical stance rather 
than merely a political policy, and insofar as it bespeaks a commitment to 
accommodating rather than suppressing cultural diversity, is an idea that 
pushes away from the various other attitudes toward a conception of an open 
society. And the classical liberal conception of multiculturalism presented 
here describes the terminating point of multiculturalism. And while no ac-
tual regime may be willing, or able, to reach (let alone sustain) such a form 
of society, it may be useful to see exactly where the theory of multicultural-
ism leads. This may be useful because it makes clear that a decision to stop 
anywhere else along the road to multiculturalism will refl ect the infl uence 
of certain cultural values that have great practical and political signifi cance 
but, from a multicultural point of view, no particular theoretical warrant.
NOTES
 1. One matter I do not address explicitly (for reasons of space) is the question of 
the nature of “culture.” For an excellent discussion, however, see Parekh 2000: 
142–78.
 2. It is worth noting that many societies contain what are referred to as “indig-
enous” populations, and so are multicultural even without the inclusion of mi-
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grants. Nonetheless, it remains true that the arrival of the fi rst outsiders created 
the cultural diversity. Subsequent visitors have simply added to the complexity 
of the picture.
 3. Of course, there already existed a certain amount of ethnic diversity in the 
Australian population. Apart from the indigenous peoples, there had been sub-
stantial Chinese migration to Australia in the nineteenth century (particularly 
during the gold rush period), and other Asian peoples had come into the coun-
try in small numbers.
 4. This discussion of assimilation ignores many of the complexities that a more 
careful and thorough analysis would have to deal with. The classic discussion 
of assimilation is Gordon 1964. See also Kukathas 1997a.
 5. Found in most city-states except Sparta, metics occupied an intermediate posi-
tion between foreigners and citizens. They enjoyed the protection of the law 
but were subject to restrictions on marriage and had a limited right to own 
property. They did not enjoy any rights of political participation.
 6. The dominant view need not be the majority view. It may simply be the view of 
the most powerful minority.
 7. I have taken issue with Kymlicka’s ideas in Kukathas 1997b, and more exten-
sively in Kukathas 2003.
 8. For an important defense of this view, see Deveaux 2000. The most important 
and infl uential advocate of a position such as this is Charles Taylor. See, for 
example, Taylor 1994. 
 9. I have argued this more fully in Kukathas 1999. 
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